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Interest of Amici Curiae 
Most of the academic signatories are current or former Ohio professors who 
teach or have taught First Amendment law, many of them for decades:  
• Jonathan L. Entin (Case Western Reserve University). 
• David F. Forte (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law). 
• Andrew Geronimo (Case Western Reserve University School of Law). 
• Raymond Ku (Case Western Reserve University School of Law). 
• Stephen R. Lazarus (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law). 
• Kevin Francis O’Neill (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law).  
• Margaret Tarkington (currently Indiana University McKinney School of 
Law, but formerly University of Cincinnati College of Law). 
The other two academic signatories are Aaron H. Caplan (Loyola Law School, 
Los Angeles) and Eugene Volokh (UCLA School of Law), who are the authors 
of two articles that deal directly with the legal issues involved in this case, 
Caplan’s Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 Hastings L.J. 781 
(2013), and Volokh’s One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal 
Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 Nw.U.L.Rev. 731 (2013). 
Recognizing the Internet’s power as a tool of democratization, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has worked for more than 25 years to protect 
the rights of users to transmit and receive information online. EFF is a non-
profit civil liberties organization with more than 30,000 dues-paying members, 
bound together by a mutual and strong interest in helping the courts ensure 
 
2 
that such rights remain protected as technologies change, new digital plat-
forms for speech emerge and reach wide adoption, and the Internet continues 
to re-shape governments’ interactions with their citizens. EFF often files ami-
cus briefs in courts across the country, including in Packingham v. North Car-
olina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 198 L.Ed.2d 273 (2017), and has often submitted amicus 
briefs regarding the availability of injunctive relief in online defamation cases, 
see, e.g., Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.2014). 
The 1851 Center for Constitutional Law is a nonprofit, nonpartisan law 
firm dedicated to protecting Ohioans’ constitutional rights, including their 
freedom of speech. 
No party or party’s counsel has authored this brief in whole or in part or 
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. 
No person has contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the 
brief, except that UCLA School of Law paid filing expenses. 
Statement of Facts 
Amici adopt the Statement of Facts from appellant-respondent’s brief. 
Summary of Argument 
1. The decision below upholds a strikingly overbroad injunction, which bans 
Mr. Rasawehr from posting anything online about petitioners. This is incon-
sistent with the First Amendment, with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and 
with precedent from other appellate courts. And even to the extent that courts 
may enjoin repetition of speech that fits within some narrow First Amendment 
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exceptions, those exceptions cannot justify barring all speech by the defendant 
about plaintiffs. 
2. The decision below reasons that Mr. Rasawehr’s speech is enjoinable be-
cause it stems from “an illegitimate reason born out of a vendetta seeking to 
cause mental distress.” Yet there is no “vendetta speech” exception to the First 
Amendment, and no exception for speech that judges believe has an “illegiti-
mate reason.” 
Mr. Rasawehr might appear to some to be obsessed and even perhaps delu-
sional. But the decision below is not limited to speech by people who come 
across this way. Rather, it sets a precedent for enjoining speech by anyone who 
sharply and repeatedly criticizes others—whether government officials, busi-
nesspeople, or, as here, family members.  
3.  The decision below also upholds a narrower provision barring Rasawehr 
from accusing petitioners online of being culpable in their husbands’ death. 
Such a provision could be constitutional following a finding on the merits that 
such specific statements are libelous, but it cannot be imposed before such a 
finding. That is what this Court concluded in O’Brien v. Univ. Comm. Tenants 
Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975); and, again, appel-
late courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same result. 
Indeed, petitioners might well be entitled to prevail in a defamation lawsuit 
against Rasawehr, assuming they can prove his allegations are false; and an 
injunction barring Rasawehr from repeating those statements might then be 
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constitutionally permissible. But any such injunction must comply with 
O’Brien, Keefe, and other precedents that properly take into account speakers’ 
First Amendment rights; the injunction in this case does not. 
Argument in Support of Proposition of Law 
I. Injunctions barring all online speech about a person are prior 
restraints that violate the First Amendment. 
An injunction against speech about a person is an unconstitutional prior 
restraint absent a finding that the speech falls within a First Amendment ex-
ception. Even if narrow restrictions on speech that is intended to cause severe 
emotional distress are constitutional, they cannot apply to all speech by the 
defendant about plaintiffs.  
Yet the Order covers all “posting about Petitioners on any social media ser-
vice, website, discussion board, or similar outlet or service.” Decision Below at 
¶ 20. The dissent below notes the injunction’s overbreadth: “[P]otential harm-
less posts . . . (i.e. birthday greetings, holiday invitations, condolences, days of 
special meaning, family events, etc. etc.) are impacted.” Id. at ¶ 53 (Zimmer-
man, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And the requirement that 
Rasawehr “remove all such postings from CountyCoverUp.com that relate to 
Petitioners,” id. at ¶ 21, also extends to all speech, not just unprotected speech.  
In O’Brien v. Univ. Comm. Tenants Union, Inc., this Court made clear that 
only specific restrictions on speech that track the narrow exceptions to the 
First Amendment may be upheld. “Once speech has judicially been found libel-
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ous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for re-
straint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper.” 42 Ohio 
St.2d 242, 244, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975) (emphasis in original). Perhaps speech 
may also be enjoined if it fits within another one of the “narrow classes of 
speech [that] are unprotected by the First Amendment.” Id. But the Order here 
unconstitutionally bans all online speech Rasawehr might make about his 
mother and his sister, regardless of whether the speech fits within one of those 
“narrow [unprotected] classes of speech.” 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent likewise forbids injunctions against all 
speech about a person. For instance, in Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), activists who disap-
proved of a real estate agent’s (apparently lawful) behavior repeatedly leafleted 
near where he lived and went to church, demanding that he change his prac-
tices. Id. “Two of the leaflets requested recipients to call respondent at his 
home phone number and urge him to sign the ‘no solicitation’ agreement.” Id. 
at 417. Yet the Court struck down an injunction against such leafleting: 
No prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in 
being free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets or 
leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court. Designating the 
conduct as an invasion of privacy . . . is not sufficient to support an in-
junction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the 
nature revealed by this record. 
Id. at 419-20. “[An] injunction, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under 
fear of punishment. Therefore, we look at the injunction as we look at a statute, 
and if upon its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, it 
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should be struck down.” United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 
576, 581, 91 S. Ct. 1076, 28 L.Ed.2d 339 (1971). 
To be sure, some unwanted speech to an unwilling recipient may be re-
stricted—but, as Keefe indicates, this cannot justify restrictions on speech 
about an unwilling subject. The government may be able “to stop the flow of 
information into [an objecting person’s] household,” but it may not attempt to 
stop the flow of such information about a person “to the public.” 402 U.S. at 
420; see also Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Crim-
inal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 Nw.U.L.Rev. 731, 745-46 
(2013). 
Other jurisdictions’ appellate decisions, as well as a recent Eleventh Dis-
trict decision, have similarly struck down such overbroad injunctions against 
speech about a person. Here are some examples: 
1. In Puruczky v. Corsi, 110 N.E.3d 73 (Ohio Ct.App.2018), the Eleventh 
District concluded that an order that “Corsi cannot contact anyone about or in 
relation to Puruczky” was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 81. Be-
cause “the trial court did not make a specific finding that speech which had 
already taken place constituted libel or defamation and cannot assume that 
future speech will fall into such a category,” id. at 82, the blanket injunction 
forbidding Corsi’s speech about Puruczky violated the First Amendment; the 
same applies to Rasawehr’s speech here. 
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2. In In re Marriage of Suggs, the Washington Supreme Court set aside a 
civil harassment restraining order that barred “knowingly and willfully mak-
ing invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints to third parties 
which are designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing, vexing, or other-
wise harming [plaintiff] and for no lawful purpose.” 152 Wash.2d 74, 78, 93 
P.3d 161 (2004). The order, the court held, was an “unconstitutional prior re-
straint,” in part because it “chill[ed] all of [defendant’s] speech about [the ben-
eficiary of the order], including that which would be constitutionally protected, 
because it is unclear what she can and cannot say.” Id. at 84. In this case, the 
order is even more chilling, because it is clear to Mr. Rasawehr that he cannot 
say anything about plaintiffs, “including that [speech] which would be consti-
tutionally protected,” id. 
3. In Ellerbee v. Mills, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated an injunction 
that barred the defendant from making 27 specific statements about the plain-
tiff. 422 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga.1992). The court “reverse[d] the injunction be-
cause the jury did not find all of those statements defamatory in its verdict and 
because the order sweeps more broadly than necessary.” Id. at 540-41. 
4. In McCarthy v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit reversed an overbroad injunc-
tion on similar grounds: “An injunction against defamatory statements, if per-
missible at all, must not through careless drafting forbid statements not yet 
determined to be defamatory, for by doing so it could restrict lawful expres-
sion. . . . As illustrative of the injunction’s resulting excessive breadth, notice 
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that it orders Hartman to take down his website, which would prevent him 
from posting any nondefamatory messages on his blog; it would thus enjoin 
lawful speech.” 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir.2015). 
5. In TM v. MZ, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed an overbroad pro-
tective order obtained against a respondent who posted “highly inflammatory 
and negative comments” about petitioner and her family online, including al-
legations that she was involved in a kidnapping. 323 Mich.App. 227, 926 
N.W.2d 900 (2018) (print page numbers not yet available). The order, the court 
held, was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. And the respondent’s words 
were constitutionally protected even if they “amounted to harassment or ob-
noxiousness.” Id. 
6. In Flood v. Wilk, the Appellate Court of Illinois struck down as unconsti-
tutional an order prohibiting the respondent from “communicating in any form 
any writing naming or regarding [petitioner], his family, or any employee, staff 
or member of [the petitioner’s congregation].” __ N.E.3d __, 2019 IL App. (1st) 
172792, ¶ 1 (Feb. 7, 2019) (precedential). “It is all but impossible,” the court 
held, “to imagine a factual record that would justify this blanket restriction on 
respondent’s speech.” Id. at ¶ 35. 
7. In David v. Textor, the Florida Court of Appeal struck down an injunction 
barring “text messages, e[-]mails, . . . tweets[, or] . . . any images or other forms 
of communication directed at John Textor without a legitimate purpose.” 189 
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So.3d 871, 874 (Fla.Ct.App.2016), This injunction, the court held, was a forbid-
den “prior restraint” because it prevented “not only communications to Textor, 
but also communications about Textor.” Id. at 876 (emphasis in original). See 
also Fox v. Hamptons at Metrowest Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 223 So.3d 453, 
457 n.3 (Fla.Ct.App.2017) (striking down, as an unconstitutional prior re-
straint, an injunction that “prohibited Fox from making any statements what-
soever pertaining to the Hamptons or to the Association on his websites, blogs, 
and social media websites”); O’Neill v. Goodwin, 195 So.3d 411, 414 
(Fla.Ct.App.2016) (concluding that an order “that Appellant shall not post on 
the internet regarding Appellee” was an unconstitutional “prior restraint” be-
cause it “prevent[ed] not only communications to [the petitioner], but also com-
munications about [the petitioner]” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
8. In Evans v. Evans, the California Court of Appeal struck down a prelim-
inary injunction prohibiting an ex-wife from posting “false and defamatory 
statements” and “confidential personal information” about her ex-husband 
online because the injunction was not limited to statements that had been 
found to be constitutionally unprotected. 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161, 76 
Cal.Rptr.3d 859 (2008).  
The upshot of these cases is consistent and simple: Injunctions against 
speech about a person are unconstitutional if they go beyond constitutionally 
unprotected categories of speech (such as defamation or true threats). 
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II. Speech cannot be restrained just because it is believed to have 
an “illegitimate reason.” 
The court below rested its decision on Rasawehr’s speech being “for an ille-
gitimate reason born out of a vendetta seeking to cause mental distress.” Opin-
ion Below at ¶ 20. But “under well-accepted First Amendment doctrine, a 
speaker’s motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional pro-
tection.” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 
L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J.) (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted); id. at 492 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.) (taking the same view). Speech 
cannot be stripped of protection on the grounds that it lacks “good motives” or 
“justifiable ends.” State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Minn.Ct.App.2015). 
And “there is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment,’” 
State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 281, 174 A.3d 987 (2017) (quoting Saxe v. State 
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir.2001) (Alito, J.)), nor a “ven-
detta” exception. 
Indeed, even in cases where speech likely stemmed from the speaker’s per-
sonal vendetta or some other “illegitimate reason,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
has treated such speech as broadly constitutionally protected. For example, 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell upheld Hustler’s right to criticize Jerry Fal-
well, even in a harsh, vulgar, and deeply emotionally distressing way. 485 U.S. 
46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). There, Hustler had published a parodic 
advertisement which “portrayed respondent as having engaged in a drunken 
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incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.” Id. at 877. The Court 
never suggested that the speech lost its protection because it stemmed from a 
personal vendetta or was motivated by an “illegitimate reason.” And in Near v. 
Minnesota, the Supreme Court made clear that a speaker’s past libelous speech 
cannot justify broad restrictions on nonlibelous speech in the future, even when 
the injunction is limited to speech said without “good motives.” 283 U.S. 697, 
713, 51 S.Ct. 265, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). 
Likewise, in Tory v. Cochran, the Court considered a case challenging the 
constitutionality of an injunction barring a disgruntled litigant from picketing 
outside his former lawyer’s office “holding up signs containing various insults 
and obscenities” (apparently as a means of pressuring the lawyer to pay the 
litigant money). 544 U.S. 734, 735, 125 S.Ct. 2108, 161 L.Ed.2d 1042 (2005). 
The Court ultimately vacated the injunction on narrow grounds: The lawyer 
had died while the case was pending, so “the grounds for the injunction [were] 
much diminished, if they have not disappeared altogether.” Id. at 738. But the 
Court agreed to hear the case despite the defendant’s likely bad intentions or 
his “vendetta” against the lawyer; and it never suggested that these factors 
stripped the speech of First Amendment protection. 
Similarly, in Henry v. Collins, the petitioner had issued press releases call-
ing his arrest “‘a diabolical plot’” driven by the County Attorney and police chief. 
380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), rev’g Henry v. Pearson, 253 
Miss. 62, 158 So.2d 695 (1963) (which offers more factual details). But the 
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Court agreed to hear the case despite that, and held that the petitioner’s speech 
was protected by the New York Times v. Sullivan rule, with no suggestion that 
it was less protected on the grounds that it may have stemmed from a personal 
vendetta or an “illegitimate reason.” 
III. Injunctions against making specific factual allegations are un-
constitutional prior restraints absent a finding on the merits 
that those allegations are false.  
Though Ohio law allows injunctions against speech once particular state-
ments have been found unprotected by the First Amendment, such injunctions 
are unconstitutional prior restraints unless they are imposed only after a trial 
on the merits:  
Once speech has judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements 
for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued pub-
lication of that same speech may be proper. The judicial determination 
that specific speech is defamatory must be made prior to any restraint. 
O’Brien v. Univ. Comm. Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 
N.E.2d 753 (1975). And “‘[t]he presumption against prior restraints is heav-
ier—and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on expres-
sion imposed by criminal penalties.’” Id. at 246 (citation omitted). Therefore, 
the law may allow only a “‘limited injunctive remedy’” against the “continued 
publication” of material “‘found after due trial’” to be constitutionally unpro-
tected. Id. (citation omitted). In the words of the Kentucky Supreme Court 
dealing with the same question, 
[T]he modern rule [is] that defamatory speech may be enjoined only af-
ter the trial court’s final determination by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the speech at issue is, in fact, false, and only then upon the 
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condition that the injunction be narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited 
speech to that which has been judicially determined to be false. 
Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309, 313 (Ky.2010) (revers-
ing an injunction that was issued before a trial on the merits); see also Balboa 
Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1156, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 
156 P.3d 339 (2007) (concluding that an injunction against libel can be “issued 
only following a determination at trial that the enjoined statements are defam-
atory”). 
Many courts have in particular recognized that it is improper to enjoin li-
bels through procedures that “deprive [the defendant] of the right to a jury trial 
concerning the truth of his or her allegedly defamatory publication.” Sid Dillon 
Chevrolet v. Sullivan, 251 Neb. 722, 730, 559 N.W.2d 740 (1997); see also 
McFadden v. Detroit Bar Ass’n, 4 Mich.App. 554, 558, 145 N.W.2d 285 (1966) 
(“[T]he defendant in a defamation action has the right to a jury trial which 
would be precluded by granting of an injunction”). Court decisions upholding 
injunctions barring continued publication of libels have stressed that the in-
junction was issued only after a “jury determination of the libelous nature of 
specific statements.” Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 678 (3d Cir.1991); see 
also Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 
(Minn.1984) (same); Ohio Const. art. I, § 11 (requiring a jury trial before alleg-
edly libelous speech can be criminally punished). Yet here there was no jury 
trial justifying this injunction, even though the injunction could be enforced 
through the threat of criminal punishment for contempt of court. 
 
14 
More broadly, order of protection proceedings offer “[n]one of the substan-
tive and procedural limitations that have been carefully constructed around 
defamation law.” Aaron Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 
Hastings L.J. 781, 822 (2013). “A petitioner should not be able to evade the 
limits on defamation law (many of them constitutionally mandated) by redes-
ignating the claim as civil harassment.” Id. The right to be free from injunc-
tions against speech until the speech is found to be false and defamatory at a 
full trial, before a jury, is one such important limit on defamation law. 
Conclusion 
Injunctions against repeating statements are unconstitutional prior re-
straints unless they are entered after a trial in which the statements are found 
to be constitutionally unprotected (for instance, libelous). Both challenged 
parts of the injunction are therefore prior restraints: One part covers all speech 
about the plaintiffs, not just libelous speech, and the other covers specific state-
ments that had not yet been found libelous at trial. This Court should reverse 
the dangerous precedent set by the court below. 
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